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INTRODUCTION 
Software piracy is costing today's software-makers billions of dollars annually (BSA, 1994; Greenberger, 
1996). Consequently, there has been an increased focus on piracy by industry groups such as the Business 
Software Alliance. Part of that focus has included an effort to stiffen penalties for piracy and to increase the 
probability of being caught. This study utilized the reference discipline of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
to study the effects of software cost, financial punishment level, and punishment probability on the 
computer-user's decision to copy software illegally in an organizational setting. Three hypotheses were 
developed and tested using an experiment. The results indicate that all three factors are related to the 
individual's piracy behavior. 
EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY 
Economic issues such as costs and benefits are commonly claimed to be factors in a person's decision-
making process. While different variants of the EUT model exist, the underlying idea is that the individual 
will choose the course of action that maximizes the expected utility for that individual (Schoemaker, 1982). 
Computer-using professionals have three possible courses of action when faced with a situation in which 
software can be used: purchase any software they may wish to use, do not purchase the relevant software 
and do without, or commit software piracy (i.e. illegally copy the software). Software is used as a substitute 
for effort. This work only studies the case where the benefit gained from using the software outweighs the 
software cost. Therefore, the rational, self-interested employee will always be expected to either pirate or 
purchase the software.  
EUT posits that costs and benefits will play major roles in the individual's decision-making process. In this 
specific case, the cost of the software is a significant factor. Also, a benefit is gained when the software is 
utilized (i.e. increased output). The utility to the individual is the benefit gained from the use of the 
software minus the cost of the software. When the software is pirated, the software cost is not incurred. 
However, there is a probability of punishment. If punishment is incurred, the level of punishment will 
become a cost to the individual. EUT posits that the rational individual will pirate the software when the 
expected utility of pirating the software (expected benefits gained from the software usage minus the 
expected costs of pirating) outweighs the expected utility of purchasing the software (expected benefits 
gained from the software minus the expected cost of purchasing).  
HYPOTHESES 
As the punishment level increases, the expected cost of pirating will increase, making the piracy option less 
likely to be chosen. 
H1: There exists an inverse relationship between the punishment level for committing software piracy and 
the computer-user's piracy behavior. 
The second hypothesis is similar to the first. As the punishment probability increases, the more likely it is 
that a punishment will be incurred if the computer-user pirates the software. This increases the cost of 
piracy. Therefore, the less likely it is that the computer-user will choose to pirate.  
H2: There exists an inverse relationship between the punishment probability for committing software 
piracy and the computer-user's piracy behavior. 
A third hypothesis involves the cost of the software. By pirating, the computer-user saves the cost of 
acquiring the software (the software cost). Therefore, as the cost of the software increases, the more money 
the computer-user will save by pirating and the more likely it is that the computer-user will pirate the 
software. 
H3: There exists a positive relationship between the software cost and the computer-user's piracy behavior. 
METHODOLOGY 
A modified lab market was utilized in the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions from a 
sample of part-time graduate students at three universities in a U.S. metropolitan area. Almost all of these 
individuals held full-time jobs that involved the use of computers. In each session, six subjects were asked 
to role-play as computer-using professionals in organizations that produced "widgets." The sessions were 
divided up into 20 time periods. In each time period, the subject's organization produced one widget that 
was to be sold on the open market. The subjects were allowed to set the price for their widgets at any level 
they desired. However, only the five lowest priced widgets were sold. The organization unable to sell its 
widget in that time period lost the widget and the cost of producing it. The five organizations that sold their 
widgets had the income (the sale price) added to their running balance. In effect, a quasi-widget market was 
produced in which the experimental controller purchased widgets produced by the subjects. To reduce 
timing strategies, the subjects were not made aware of the actual length of the session.  
To produce the widget, the subjects were given the option to purchase software in that time period, to not 
use any software, or to pirate the software. Purchasing the software involved a cost (the software cost). 
Pirating the software involved no cost, but did involve the probability of detection and the leveling of a 
financial fine if the piracy was caught. The subjects were made aware of both the punishment probability 
and the punishment level if caught. In all cases involving the software, there was a benefit gained from the 
use of the software: the cost for producing the widget was reduced due to the increased productivity gained 
from the software usage. 
A running balance was kept for each subject. In each time period, the subject was charged a set amount for 
producing the widget. If the subject sold the widget, that income was added to his or her balance. If the 
subject purchased the software, the production costs were reduced by a set amount and the subject was 
charged for the software. The software cost was always less than the benefit gained. If the subject pirated 
the software, there was no software cost incurred, but the benefit from software usage reduced the cost of 
producing the widget.  
At the end of the time period, a random number generator was used to determine if any subjects were 
audited by the authorities. If a subject was audited and had pirated the software, a financial fine was 
incurred and subtracted from the subject's running balance. At the end of the session, the subject with the 
highest total was financially rewarded, as were those subjects who finished with a profit. 
By manipulating the variables (software cost, punishment probability, and punishment level) and 
monitoring the decision to pirate or not pirate, it was possible to test the hypotheses outlined above. Each 
variable was tested at two levels, making it necessary to run eight (2x2x2) experimental sessions to ensure 
that all combinations were tested. The values utilized in the experiment are shown in Table 1. These values 
were carefully chosen to ensure that perfectly rational behavior would predict that software piracy would 
occur in four of the scenarios and purchasing would occur in the other four. 
The experiment was run in a computer lab using software written by the first author. Each subject sat at his 
or her own terminal. Using the designed interface, the subjects entered their choices (i.e. purchase software, 
pirate software, set widget price, etc.). The software recorded the subjects' choices in each session. A 
central computer was used to display the running balance for each subject, visible to all subjects on a 
projection screen. The software also randomly selected subjects for audit in each time period (using the 
prespecified punishment probability for the session) and assessed fines automatically when pirates were 
caught. Audit and punishment data were displayed on the selected subjects' terminals when appropriate. 
Table 1: Variable Settings in the Experiment 
Variable Settings 
Cost to produce one widget $100 
Benefit gained from software $40 
Software Cost $10, $30 
Punishment Probability 5%, 50% 
Punishment Level $50, $250 
Table 2: Number of Decisions to Pirate in Each Session 
Software Cost = $10 
Punishment Level 
Probability $50 $250 
.05 38 (31.7%) 26 (21.7%) 
.50 39 (32.5%) 13 (10.8%) 
Software Cost = $30 
Punishment Level 
Probability $50 $250 
.05 77 (64.2%) 39 (32.5%) 
.50 58 (48.3%) 8 (6.7%) 
RESULTS 
In each session, 120 decisions to pirate or not pirate were made (20 decisions each by 6 subjects). Table 2 
details how many decisions to pirate were made in each session. As this decision was dichotomous, it was 
possible to test the hypotheses using Chi-square analysis. For each hypothesis, significant results were 
found. In the sessions where the software cost was high ($30), there were many more decisions to pirate 
than in the sessions where software cost was low ($10) (Chi-square: 20.56, p<.0005). In the sessions where 
the punishment probability was high (50%), there were significantly fewer decisions to pirate than in the 
sessions where the punishment probability was low (5%) (Chi-square: 18.107, p<.0005). In the sessions 
where the punishment level was high ($500), there were significantly fewer decisions to pirate than in the 
sessions with the lower punishment level ($50) (Chi-square: 76.036, p<.0005).  
DISCUSSION 
The results indicate that the software industry's attempts to increase the chances of being punished for 
software piracy are well-founded. By increasing the probability of punishment, it may be possible to 
decrease the incidence of software piracy. The much publicized Software Publishers Association piracy 
hotline is one attempt to increase this probability. Similarly, the use of legal action to inflict punishment is 
shown to be a valid tool in combating piracy. It is important to note that these efforts will only be 
successful if computer-users are made aware of these higher levels and actually perceive the probability of 
punishment and punishment level to be significantly higher than at present.  
On an organizational level, the research indicates that a liberal purchasing policy may be a good deterrent 
of piracy among employees. If an employee has a software package legally and cheaply available to him or 
her, he or she may be less likely to pirate the software. This strategy has been recommended in the 
practitioner literature (e.g. Athey, 1989) and may be inexpensive when compared to the possible 
punishments associated with piracy behavior. The organization may also be able to use internal audits and 
punishment to minimize piracy behavior among employees. 
CONCLUSION 
This abstract describes a study of the effects of software cost, punishment probability and punishment level 
on the individual's decision to pirate software. The results indicate that each of these items is a determining 
factor in the piracy decision. This supports the software industry's attempts to decrease piracy through 
increased auditing and detection and may provide useful guidance to organizations attempting to reduce 
internal piracy. 
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